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“PERHAPS CONGRESS WOULD, PERHAPS CONGRESS
SHOULD”—WHY MATCH-E-BE-NASH-SHE-WISH BAND
OF POTTAWATOMI INDIANS v. PATCHAK AND CARCIERI
v. SALAZAR MUST BE LEGISLATIVELY OVERRIDDEN TO
PROTECT THE IRA TRUST ACQUISITION AUTHORITY
Kendall McCoy*
Introduction
Land ownership allows for the preservation of distinct nationhood,
making it central to the sovereignty of Indian tribes. 1 Tribes have certain
rights as distinct nations due to their legal status as separate governments
that pre-exist the Constitution.2 They have inherent sovereignty as selfgoverning peoples.3 But because Indian tribes are “domestic dependent
nations” that have protectorate relationships with the United States, they do
not have all attributes of sovereignty. 4 Due to this state of dependency,
Congress has plenary power over the affairs with and of the Indian tribes,
and Congress uses that power to decide the “metes and bounds of tribal
sovereignty,” exclusive of the states. 5 This plenary power also gave rise to
the federal-tribal trust relationship, which dictates, among other things, that
the federal government must protect tribal property. 6
Treaties served as the earliest negotiating tool between Indian tribes and
the United States, and special canons of construction arose from that
tradition. 7 These canons, when applied, serve to rectify the inequality
inherent in these early agreements, which were not “arm’s-length
transaction[s]” but compacts which tribes had “imposed upon them [with]
no choice but to consent.”8 Therefore, any treaty or statute relating to
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 15.01, at 965 (Nell Jessup Newton
et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter COHEN].
2. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
3. Id.
4. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
5. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 202 (2004).
6. Sarah Washburn, Distinguishing Carcieri v. Salazar: Why the Supreme Court Got It
Wrong and How Congress and Courts Should Respond to Preserve Tribal and Federal
Interests in the IRA’s Trust-Land Provisions, 85 WASH. L. REV. 603, 605 (2010).
7. COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.03[1], at 26.
8. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-31 (1970).
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Indians must be liberally construed for the benefit of the Indians,
interpreted “so far as possible” as the Indians would have understood it, and
read with all ambiguities resolved in their favor. 9 These canons are “rooted
in the unique trust relationship between the United States and the Indians”
and are essential to the protection of tribal rights. 10
When the Supreme Court ignores the Indian canons and disregards the
federal trust obligation, there are devastating consequences for Indian
Country, especially in the tribal property arena. In the 2012 case of MatchE-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak (“Patchak
I”),11 the Court considered whether an individual had standing to divest the
federal government of its title to Indian trust land. 12 David Patchak, a
neighbor to a parcel of land that was taken into trust for the Match-E-BeNash-She-Wish Band, challenged the acquisition under the Administrative
Procedure Act by alleging “economic, environmental, and aesthetic harms”
from the parcel’s use for gaming.13 The government argued that the Quiet
Title Act, which retained the sovereign immunity of the United States
concerning land it already held in trust for tribes, barred the suit. 14 The
Supreme Court held that the Quiet Title Act was not applicable when the
challenging plaintiff did not assert its own title to the land. 15 It further held
that a neighboring landowner did have standing to challenge an already
completed trust acquisition and remanded Patchak’s suit for further
proceedings.16 Patchak I further unsettled the fee-to-trust process, which
had already been rocked by the 2009 decision of Carcieri v. Salazar.17 In
Carcieri, the Supreme Court limited the use of the Indian Reorganization
Act18 authority to take land into trust by restricting the avenue to only tribes
under federal jurisdiction in 1934, the year the Act was passed. 19

9. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Choctaw
Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943); Alaska Pac. Fisheries Co. v.
United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918).
10. Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985).
11. 567 U.S. 209 (2012).
12. Id. at 214.
13. Id. at 212 (citing Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706).
14. Id. at 215 (citing Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (2018)).
15. Id. at 215-24.
16. Id. at 224-28.
17. 555 U.S. 379 (2009).
18. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5129
(2018)).
19. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 394.
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Application of the Indian canons likely would have resulted in victories for
tribal interests, or at least fewer negative consequences. 20
The Supreme Court provided a narrow remedy for its prior meddling in
Indian property rights when it decided Patchak v. Zinke (“Patchak II”)21 in
2018. While Patchak’s initial suit was on remand, Congress passed the Gun
Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, 22 requiring dismissal of any pending
federal action relating to the land at issue in Patchak I.23 By plurality
opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the power of Congress to enact such
legislation, holding that it did not violate Article III of the Constitution. 24
The Supreme Court explained that the Gun Lake Act did not impermissibly
compel a certain result under old law but instead changed the law via a
valid exercise of legislative power.25 As a result, Patchak’s suit was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 26
Although the Patchak II remedy seems to lessen the barriers created by
Carcieri and Patchak I, it presumes that tribes are able to exercise enough
political influence on Congress to pass special laws each time a trust
acquisition is challenged. 27 Such piecemeal legislation is expensive,
inefficient, and ineffectual, as it likely provides relief to very few, if any,
tribes. This Note argues that because the remedy provided by Patchak II
does not go far enough, Congress must instead override the Patchak and
Carcieri decisions. Part I provides a brief history of Indian property rights.
Part II outlines Patchak as it twice made its way through the Supreme
Court. Part III analyzes the confluence of Patchak I and Carcieri, the
implications of the remedy provided by Patchak II, and the reasons for a
larger legislative fix.
I. History of Indian Property Rights
Since the founding of the United States, Congress has variously used its
plenary power to restrict tribal sovereign authority or to relax previous

20. Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act at 25: Successes,
Shortcomings, and Dilemmas, FED. LAW., Apr. 2013, at 35, 38-39.
21. 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018).
22. Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913 (2014).
23. Id. at 902-03.
24. Id. at 906.
25. Id. at 908 (referencing Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act § 2(b), 128 Stat. at
1913).
26. Id. at 904.
27. Id. at 910.
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restrictions, leading to cognizable eras in the federal-tribal relationship. 28
These Indian policies, which were “applicable to numerous tribes . . . [and]
affect[ed] billions of acres of land,” necessarily shifted with the needs of
the United States.29 This is especially apparent regarding tribal property
interests.30 Under the controlling property regime of the United States,
tribal property interests are split between the federal government, which
holds ultimate title, and the Indian tribes, which retain aboriginal title and a
right of occupancy subject to alteration or complete divestment at the will
of the federal government. 31 As national Indian policies have fluctuated
over the centuries, so too has the strength (and even the existence) of tribal
property rights.
A. Federal Indian Policy Eras, 1789 to Present
During the period of treaty-making following the adoption of the
Constitution in 1789, tribes were required to trade large tracts of their
ancestral territories for goods, services, and the right to continue selfgovernance under the protection of the United States. 32 But as the United
States’ population grew, so did the demand for land in the South and East
Coast regions.33 Forced removal became the dominant strategy to
extinguish Indian title. 34 In exchange for relinquishing their rights to the
entirety of their eastern homelands, removed tribes were given new
territories in the west.35 Following many acts of brutality, coercion, and
fraud, most tribes had been removed from the eastern states by 1850. 36 To
exact further control and isolation, the reservation system developed,
whereby tribes were concentrated onto small sections of land and provided
animals, tools, and an education in an effort to civilize and prepare them for
assimilation. 37
By the late nineteenth century, the national policy of segregating entire
tribes onto reservations shifted to allotting those reservation lands to tribal

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 202 (2004).
Id.
Id.
See Johnson v, M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 585 (1823).
COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.03[1], at 29.
Id. § 1.03[4][a], at 45-48.
Id.
Id. § 1.03[4][a], at 45-48, 54.
Id. § 1.03[4][a], at 54.
Id. § 1.03[6][a], at 64-65.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol43/iss2/7

No. 2]

NOTES

463

members individually. 38 The General Allotment Act, also known as the
Dawes Act, was passed in 1887.39 Its basic objectives were to “extinguish
tribal sovereignty, erase reservation boundaries, and force the assimilation
of Indians into the society at large.” 40 Each individual Indian was allotted a
parcel, usually 160 acres of grazing land or eighty acres of agricultural land,
the patent to which was held by the United States in trust for that individual
allottee for a period of twenty-five years.41 Following that period, the patent
was discharged of the trust, and the allottee received the land in fee. 42 Any
reservation land not allotted was declared surplus and opened for nonIndian settlement, which permanently reshaped and diminished Indian
Country. 43 At enactment, Indian landholdings across the lower forty-eight
states totaled 140 million acres.44 During the fifty years that the General
Allotment Act was the foundation of federal action, that number plunged to
fifty-two million acres—a staggering loss of ninety million acres from
Indian control. 45
The passage of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) 46 in 1934 was a
landmark change in federal policy. 47 The IRA “put a halt to the loss of tribal
lands” by repudiating the prior policies of allotment and assimilation. 48 It
also allowed tribes “a greater degree of self-government, both politically
and economically” by establishing procedures for organizing governments
and chartering business corporations. 49 The keystone of the IRA is section
5, which empowers the Secretary to “acquire . . . any interest in lands . . .
for the purpose of providing land for Indians,” which allowed for the
creation, expansion, or restoration of Indian reservations. 50 Importantly,
“Indian” is defined in section 19 to include (1) “all persons of Indian
38. Cty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S.
251, 253-54 (1992).
39. Id. at 254 (citing General Allotment Act (Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887)
(repealed 2000)).
40. Id.
41. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 3 (1956).
42. Id.
43. CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE : THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 43
(2005).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 51015129) (reclassified from 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479).
47. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 151 (1973).
48. Id.
49. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 542 (1974).
50. Indian Reorganization Act § 5, 25 U.S.C. § 5108.
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descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal
jurisdiction,” (2) “all persons who are descendants of such members who
were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian
reservation,” and (3) “all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood.” 51
The Carcieri decision later qualified the first definition, holding that the
statutory “term ‘now under Federal jurisdiction’ . . . unambiguously refers
to those tribes that were under the federal jurisdiction of the United States
when the IRA was enacted in 1934.”52 Accordingly, when a tribe is found
not to have been under federal jurisdiction in 1934, it is not “Indian” for the
purposes of section 19, and the Secretary lacks section 5 authority to take
land into trust for its benefit.53 Notwithstanding the IRA and other
legislation that brought about better and more efficient uses of tribal
resources, poor economic conditions for tribes continued as before. 54
This attempt to foster tribal development was interrupted by another
period of congressional efforts to sever ties between the federal government
and Indian tribes in hopes of a “future in which Indians would disappear as
a distinctive group within the United States.”55 Termination became the
controlling national policy in 1953 with the passage of House Concurrent
Resolution 108, which mandated the end of the federal trustee
relationship. 56 Later, specific termination legislation allowed for greater
state involvement in the form of criminal and civil jurisdiction, and for
some tribes, the liquidation of tribal assets (including reservation
landholdings) and the end of federal recognition and services. 57 By the time
termination was renounced in the 1970s, more than 100 tribes had been
terminated, affecting 11,000 people and 1.3 million acres—a diminishment
of 2.5 percent of Indian trust land.58
Indian policy shifted into its modern form during the 1960s in response
to growing civil rights concerns. 59 This new perspective recognized tribal
self-determination and self-governance as the exercise of inherent sovereign
powers.60 Acknowledgement of the nation-to-nation relationships between
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. § 10, 25 U.S.C. § 5129.
Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 395 (2009).
Id. at 394-95.
COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.05, at 88.
FREDERICK E. HOXIE, THIS INDIAN COUNTRY: AMERICAN INDIAN ACTIVISTS AND THE
PLACE THEY M ADE 320 (2012).
56. Id. at 327.
57. WILKINSON, supra note 43, at 82-84.
58. Id. at 81.
59. COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.07, at 98.
60. Id.
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the federal government and the individual Indian tribes has brought about
greater tribal involvement in federal policy development. 61 Such
collaboration has allowed for legislation and programs that emphasize tribal
decision-making, cultural preservation, and economic development. 62 How
long this respect for self-governance will last is unclear, however, as the
unique standing of tribes remains open to legislative—and increasingly
judicial—alteration.
B. The Fee-to-Trust Statutory Process Prior to Patchak I
The Secretary of the Interior’s section 5 authority to take land into trust
under the Indian Reorganization Act is implemented by Department of the
Interior (DOI) regulations at 25 C.F.R. Part 151.63 Land may be taken into
trust for an Indian tribe when: (1) the land is either already within the
exterior boundaries of the tribe’s existing reservation or adjacent to it, (2)
the tribe “already owns an interest in the land,” or (3) the land acquisition is
“necessary to facilitate tribal self-determination, economic development, or
Indian housing.”64 Once the land is held in fee by the tribe, it submits an
application to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to formally begin the feeto-trust process; this application requires a legal land description, an
explanation of why the acquisition is needed, the purpose for which the
property would be used, and if the property is located off-reservation, a
business plan or the location of the property relative to state and reservation
boundaries. 65 The BIA then gives notice to affected state and local
governments and allows a thirty-day comment period regarding possible
impacts to “regulatory jurisdiction, real property taxes, and special
assessments.”66 Once a final determination is made to take the land into
trust, notice of the determination is published and if no challenge arises, the
land comes under tribal jurisdiction, with the United States retaining
ultimate title.67
The entire land-into-trust process was called into question in South
Dakota v. United States Department of Interior.68 In that case, the Secretary
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See id. § 1.07, at 99.
Id. at 112.
25 C.F.R. §§ 151.1-.15(2019).
Id. § 151.3(a).
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, ACQUISITION OF TITLE TO LAND HELD
RESTRICTED FEE STATUS 67-68 (2016).
66. 25 C.F.R. §§ 151.10, 151.11(d) (2019).
67. COHEN, supra note 1, § 15.07[1][b], at 1012.
68. 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995), vacated, 519 U.S. 919 (1996).
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asserted before the Eighth Circuit that because a section 5 land acquisition
was an “agency action [that] is committed to agency discretion by law,” 69 it
was not open to judicial review. 70 This caused the circuit court to consider
whether the provision violated the nondelegation doctrine, which states that
Congress cannot delegate its legislative power to any other branch of
government.71 The circuit court explained that although it is permissible for
Congress to obtain assistance from the other branches, it must first provide
legislative standards or boundaries that govern the exercise of such a
delegated power. 72 Because the language of section 5 provided no boundary
or guiding principle except that the acquisition be “for Indians,” courts had
no ascertainable standard against which to test whether that delegated
discretion had been exercised in a way that furthered congressional intent. 73
After concluding that the Secretary had an “unrestricted, unreviewable
power” to take land into trust, the court held the power invalid as a
violation of the nondelegation doctrine. 74
In response to this decision, and while awaiting a grant of certiorari from
the Supreme Court, the DOI promulgated a new rule stating that the
Secretary could not take land into trust until at least thirty days following
publication of the final agency determination in the Federal Register.75 This
set window of time permitted judicial review of the Secretary’s decision
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) before “formal conveyance
of title to land to the United States.”76 The DOI specifically established this
rule on its understanding that the Quiet Title Act (QTA), which “does not
apply to trust or restricted Indian lands,” 77 would preclude judicial review
once the United States held title to the land at issue. The Eighth Circuit
decision was later vacated and remanded to the Secretary for
reconsideration by the Supreme Court, which, although it gave no definite
ruling, seemed to signal its agreement that the QTA would act as such a

69. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2018).
70. South Dakota, 69 F.3d at 881-82.
71. Id. at 881.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 883-85.
74. Id. at 884-85.
75. 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(b) (2011) (amended in 2013).
76. Land Acquisitions, 61 Fed. Reg. 18082-01, 18082 (Bureau of Indian Affairs Apr.
24, 1996) (codified at 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(b)) (amended in 2013).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (2018).
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bar.78 Indeed, this agency understanding that sovereign immunity barred
judicial review and title challenges after the land had been taken into trust
found support in decisions made by the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits.79
II. Statement of the Patchak Cases
Both Patchak cases center around the decision of the DOI to take land
into trust for the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi
Indians. The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians
(“the Band”), also known as the Gun Lake Tribe, consists of 277 citizens
and is headquartered in central Michigan. 80 Despite having existed in that
area continuously since the turn of the nineteenth century, the Band was
only formally recognized by the DOI in 1999.81 Two years later, after
acquiring 147 acres of land (“Bradley Property”) in Wayland Township, a
rural farming community thirty miles from Grand Rapids, the Band
petitioned the Secretary to take the land into trust under section 5 of the
IRA.82 The application included the Band’s intention to construct and
operate a casino on the property.83
In 2005, the Secretary issued a formal notice of decision to take the land
into trust, and pursuant to agency rule, held off completing the transaction
for thirty days to allow interested parties to seek judicial review. 84 During
that period, the Michigan Gambling Opposition (“MichGO”) brought suit in
the D.C. District Court alleging violations of the Indian Gaming Regulatory

78. Anna O’Brien, Casenote and Comment, Misadventures in Indian Law: The Supreme
Court’s Patchak Decision, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 581, 590 (2014) (discussing taking land into
trust).
79. Shivwits Band of Paiute Indians v. Utah, 428 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2005); Neighbors
for Rational Dev., Inc. v. Norton, 379 F.3d 956 (10th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Patchak I,
567 U.S. 209 (2012); Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. United States, 830 F.2d 139 (9th Cir.
1987), abrogated by Patchak I, 567 U.S. 209; Fla. Dep’t of Bus. Regulation v. Dep’t of
Interior, 768 F.2d 1248 (11th Cir. 1985), abrogated by Patchak I, 567 U.S. 209.
80. Mich. Gambling Opposition v. Kempthorne, 525 F.3d 23, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
81. Final Determination to Acknowledge the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of
Pottawatomi Indians of Michigan, 63 Fed. Reg. 56936-01 (Bureau of Indian Affairs Oct. 23,
1998).
82. Patchak v. Salazar, 632 F.3d 702, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
83. Id.
84. Notice of Final Agency Determination to Take Land into Trust Under 25 CFR Part
151, 70 Fed. Reg. 25596-02 (Bureau of Indian Affairs May 13, 2005).
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Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. 85 Although the district
court initially issued a stay of the agency action, it later dismissed the suit,
with the D.C. Circuit affirming in April 2008.86 Shortly after the dismissal,
some three years after publication of the Secretary’s intent to take the land
into trust, David Patchak filed his own challenge to the trust decision under
the APA and sought an injunction to bar the acquisition.87
Patchak alleged that because the Band was only recognized in 1999, it
was not under federal jurisdiction in 1934 and the Secretary therefore had
no authority to take land into trust for its benefit.88 To establish standing,
Patchak argued that taking the Bradley Property into trust for gaming
purposes would adversely impact him as a neighbor of the parcel by
bringing millions of visitors into the area each year, increasing crime,
traffic, and pollution, and decreasing property values. 89 Patchak made no
personal claim to the Bradley Property. 90 The request for injunction was
mooted in January 2009 when the Secretary took the land into trust after the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in the MichGO case.91 On February 24, the
Supreme Court decided Carcieri v. Salazar, agreeing with Patchak that
Secretarial authority under IRA section 5 was limited to tribes that had been
under federal jurisdiction in 1934.92 Regardless of the relevance of
Carcieri, the district court dismissed the suit for lack of prudential standing,
as Patchak’s interests “actively r[a]n contrary to” the IRA’s zone-ofinterests.93
Although it recognized the opinions of its sister circuits, the D.C. Circuit
reversed, holding the QTA to be inoperative as Patchak made no personal
claim to the Bradley Property. 94 Absent the immunity provided by the QTA,
the APA controlled, and Patchak’s suit could move forward for further

85. Mich. Gambling Opposition v. Norton, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2018); National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370e (2018)).
86. Mich. Gambling Opposition v. Kempthorne, 525 F.3d 23, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 555 U.S. 1137 (2009).
87. Patchak v. Salazar, 646 F. Supp. 2d 72, 74 (D.D.C. 2009).
88. Id.
89. Patchak I, 567 U.S. 209, 213 (2012).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 214.
92. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 395 (2009).
93. Patchak, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 78.
94. Patchak v. Salazar, 632 F.3d 702, 712 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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proceedings.95 The court further held that Patchak’s “intense and obvious”
interests satisfied the requirements of prudential standing. 96
A. Patchak I
1. Majority Decision
Acknowledging the circuit split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
and, in a near unanimous decision, affirmed the conclusion of the D.C.
Circuit.97 The Supreme Court concerned itself with two separate issues:
first, whether the sovereign immunity arising from the QTA shielded the
United States from Patchak’s suit; and second, if it did not, whether Patchak
had prudential standing to allow his challenge to proceed. 98 Since Patchak
brought his suit under the APA’s general waiver of sovereign immunity, the
Supreme Court considered that issue first. 99
The APA general waiver of sovereign immunity exposes the United
States to suits—like Patchak’s—that seek non-monetary relief to address
the action or inaction of a federal agency or its employee under color of
legal authority. 100 The waiver does not apply whenever “any other statute
that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is
sought” by the claimant.101 Because the Secretary continued to argue that
the Indian lands exception of the QTA became operative after the United
States acquired title to the Bradley Property, thus fulfilling the APA “carveout,” the Supreme Court shifted its focus to the QTA.102
The QTA waives immunity when the plaintiff brings a quiet title suit
against the government by asserting a “right, title, or interest” in real
property that conflicts with the claimed ownership or interest of the United
States.103 This suit authorization, however, “does not apply to trust or
restricted Indian lands.”104 When this exception applies, it works to “retain
the United States’ immunity from suit.” 105 The question then became

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id. at 707.
Patchak I, 567 U.S. 209, 228 (2012).
Id. at 212.
Id. at 215.
Id.
5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018).
Patchak I, 567 U.S. at 215.
28 U.S.C. § 2409a(d) (2018).
Id. § 2409a(a).
United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 842 (1986).
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whether Patchak had indeed brought a quiet title suit as stipulated by the
QTA, thereby barring his demand for relief. 106
Although Patchak’s suit did attempt to “strip the United States of title to
the land,” the Supreme Court determined that the QTA Indian lands
exception applied only to actions in which the plaintiff claimed a private
interest in the property.107 The Supreme Court found justification for this
determination in two of its prior decisions: Block v. North Dakota ex rel.
Board of University & School Lands108 and United States v. Mottaz.109 In
Block, the Supreme Court held that North Dakota, as an adverse claimant to
the United States, could not bypass the QTA’s statute of limitations by
seeking alternative statutory remedies, including the APA. 110 In Mottaz, the
Supreme Court held that when plaintiffs themselves assert title to the
property in question, the QTA governs the suit. 111 Therefore, the “defining
feature of a QTA action” is for the plaintiff to seek to protect a claim
antagonistic to a property interest of the federal government. 112 Patchak,
unlike the Block and Mottaz plaintiffs, never raised an argument that he
personally held claim to the land or had any actual right to possess it. 113
Because he only argued that the taking of the land into trust violated the
IRA, his suit is a “garden-variety APA claim,” and the QTA’s waiver of
sovereign immunity applies. 114
The Supreme Court analysis then turned to whether prudential standing
grounds should bar Patchak’s suit.115 To bring suit under the APA, Patchak
must fall within its “aggrieved” standard, meaning that Article III injury-infact requirements are satisfied and the “interest he asserts [is] ‘arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute’ that
he says was violated.”116 In keeping with the APA’s “generous review
provisions,” the zone-of-interests test favors judicial review and allows for
all benefit of the doubt to go to the plaintiff. 117 It only bars a suit when the
106. Patchak I, 567 U.S. at 215.
107. Id. at 232.
108. 461 U.S. 273 (1983).
109. 476 U.S. 834 (1986).
110. Block, 461 U.S. at 277.
111. Mottaz, 476 U.S. at 841-42.
112. Patchak I, 567 U.S. at 220.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 220-21.
115. Id. at 224.
116. Id. (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970)).
117. Id. at 225 (citing Clarke v. Secs. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987)).
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interest of the plaintiff is “so marginally related to or inconsistent with the
purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that
Congress intended to permit the suit.” 118
The Secretary contended that section 5 of the IRA—with its stated
purpose of providing land for tribes—focuses on land acquisition, making
Patchak’s interests in the land’s use as a casino insufficient for purposes of
standing. 119 The Supreme Court disagreed, saying that when considered in
context of the IRA’s overarching goal to “rehabilitate the Indian’s
economic life,”120 section 5 “functions as a primary mechanism to foster
Indian tribes’ economic development.”121 Furthermore, because DOI
regulations require the Secretary to consider the “purposes for which the
land will be used”122 and the “potential conflicts of land use which may
arise,”123 whenever land is taken into trust, it is done “with at least one eye
directed toward how tribes will use those lands to support economic
development.”124
Because section 5 land-into-trust decisions are “closely enough and often
enough entwined with considerations of land use to make that difference
immaterial,” the Supreme Court concluded that the interests of neighbors
who may suffer “economic, environmental, or aesthetic” harm are within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the IRA and are open to
judicial review under the APA. 125 After holding that neither the QTA
sovereign immunity nor the doctrine of prudential standing worked to bar
Patchak’s suit, the Court remanded the case to the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia for consideration on the merits.126
2. Dissent
Justice Sotomayor filed the only dissenting opinion and argued that the
QTA should bar Patchak’s suit. She contended that allowing a plaintiff to
strip the government of title to Indian land held in trust using the APA
effectively nullified the QTA, which Congress and the executive branch
intended to be the sole process to resolve property disputes with the United
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973).
Patchak I, 567 U.S. at 226.
25 C.F.R. § 151.10(c) (2018).
Id. § 151.10(f).
Patchak I, 567 U.S. at 226.
Id. at 227-28.
Id. at 228.
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States.127 Such divestment is relief that has been specifically prohibited by
the QTA.128 That Congress did not expressly exclude suits like Patchak’s—
which asserts only a weak interest in the disputed property rather than an
ordinary quiet title action—is of no issue, as the APA carve-out is satisfied
even if the relief Patchak seeks is only impliedly forbidden. 129
Unlike the majority, Justice Sotomayor considered the real-world
consequences to be suffered by Indian Country. She first recognized that
the Indian land exception reflects congressional acknowledgement of the
“specific commitments” and “solemn obligations” the government has
made with and to the Indians via treaty and other agreements. 130 She then
chided the majority for obliterating the thirty-day regulatory window for
judicial review, as extending that window to the APA six-year statute of
limitations only frustrates the IRA’s central goal of encouraging tribal
economic development. 131
B. The Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act
One secretarial argument put forward in Patchak I seemed to garner the
slim support of the Supreme Court; the DOI urged that Patchak’s suit
should be treated like that of an adverse claimant because both pose an
equal risk of harm to tribal interests, which the Indian land exception
purposefully seeks to protect.132 While the Supreme Court conceded that the
argument was persuasive, it only said that “perhaps Congress would—
perhaps Congress should” decide that the harms be treated exactly the same
under the QTA.133 While the case was on remand, Congress spoke—at least
partially—on the issue by passing the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation
Act (“Gun Lake Act”). 134 It stated that:
(a) IN GENERAL. —The land taken into trust by the United
States for the benefit of the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band
of Pottawatomi Indians . . . is reaffirmed as trust land, and the
actions of the Secretary of the Interior in taking that land into
trust are ratified and confirmed.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 231 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 228.
Id. at 236 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 229 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 237 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 223.
Id. at 224.
Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913 (2014).
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(b) NO CLAIMS. —Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
an action (including an action pending in a Federal court as of
the date of enactment of this Act) relating to the land described
in subsection (a) shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal
court and shall be promptly dismissed. 135
Over Patchak’s objection that the Gun Lake Act impermissibly infringed
on the Article III power of the judicial branch, the district court dismissed
his suit for lack of jurisdiction and held that there existed “no constitutional
obstacle” to stop the Act’s enforcement.136 The D.C. Circuit Court affirmed
the dismissal, holding that the plain language of the Gun Lake Act did strip
federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction regarding the Bradley
Property.137 It further held that because Congress had supplied new law
rather than “direct[ing] the result of pending litigation” as prohibited by
Article III, the Gun Lake Act was constitutionally sound and the dismissal
appropriate.138
C. Patchak II
1. Majority Decision
The Supreme Court again granted certiorari, and in a plurality opinion
written by Justice Thomas and joined by Justices Breyer, Alito, and Kagan,
affirmed the decision of the D.C. Circuit Court.139 It began by first
distinguishing between “permissible exercises of the legislative power and
impermissible infringements of the judicial power.”140 The Constitution
created three branches of government, giving “[t]o the legislative
department . . . the duty of making laws; to the executive the duty of
executing them; and to the judiciary the duty of interpreting and applying
them in cases properly brought before the courts.”141 This separation of
powers works to keep Congress from exercising judicial power properly
vested in the judiciary under Article III. 142 Congress oversteps these bounds
whenever it “usurp[s] a court’s power to interpret and apply the law to the
135. Id. § 2(a)-(b), 128 Stat. at 1913.
136. Patchak v. Jewell, 109 F. Supp. 3d 152, 165 (D.D.C. 2015).
137. Patchak v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 995, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
138. Id. at 1002.
139. Patchak II, 138 S. Ct. 897, 903 (2018) (plurality opinion).
140. Id. at 905.
141. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S 447, 488 (1923).
142. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish . . . .”).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

474

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

[circumstances] before it.”143 However, because the legislative power is the
power to make law, Congress does have the authority to “make laws that
apply retroactively to pending lawsuits, even when it effectively ensures
that one side wins.”144
The rule, then, is that Article III is violated whenever Congress forces a
particular result or finding under an old law, but is not violated when
Congress chooses instead to change the law. 145 A jurisdiction-stripping
statute addresses “a court’s competence to adjudicate a particular category
of cases,”146 and for purposes of Article III, constitutes a change in the law
within Congress’s permissible legislative authority. 147 Section 2(b) of the
Gun Lake Act removes from all federal courts the jurisdiction to hear any
action that relates to the Bradley Property, includes no exceptions, and
forces dismissal as its single judicial consequence. 148 Because section 2(b)
only addresses “a court’s competence to adjudicate a particular category of
cases,” it can only be read and understood as a jurisdiction-stripping
statute.149
The ability to create a jurisdiction-stripping statute is a result of Article
I,150 which grants to Congress the great power to establish lower federal
courts and inherently includes the “lesser power to ‘limit the jurisdiction of
those Courts.’”151 Jurisdiction is the “power to declare the law,” so
jurisdiction-stripping statutes do not themselves involve “the exercise of
judicial power” or constitute “legislative interference with courts in the
exercising of continuing jurisdiction.”152 Moreover, in most instances, a
grant of jurisdiction from Congress is required before the exercise of
judicial power, meaning that an Act of Congress can “restrain[ ] the courts
from acting at certain times, and even restrain[ ] them from acting
permanently regarding certain subjects.” 153 Consequently, stripping federal
courts of jurisdiction is a valid power of Congress on par with declaring
143. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1323 (2016).
144. Patchak II, 138 S. Ct. at 905.
145. Id.
146. Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 316 (2006).
147. Patchak II, 138 S. Ct. at 905.
148. Id. (citing Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act § 2(b), 128 Stat. at 1913).
149. Id. at 906.
150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (“To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court”).
151. Patchak II, 138 S. Ct. at 906 (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
32, 33 (1812)).
152. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514-15 (1868).
153. Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998).
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war, laying taxes, and coining money. 154 The power is plenary unless it
violates some other constitutional provision. 155
Patchak did not dispute that Congress had the power to remove
jurisdiction from federal courts.156 He countered, however, that even if
section 2(b) did permissibly strip courts of jurisdiction, it violated Article
III on other grounds—firstly, because it “flatly directs” dismissal without
allowing federal courts to interpret or apply any new law, and secondly,
because it interfered with the Supreme Court’s decision in Patchak I.157 The
Supreme Court quickly dispensed with both arguments.
Section 2(b) does not direct dismissal under old law; instead, it is a
newly created law for challenges “relating to” the Bradley Property, and the
District Court did correctly interpret and apply that standard to Patchak’s
suit.158 Even the mandatory language of section 2(b)—“shall be promptly
dismissed”—does not direct an outcome but rather imposes dismissal as the
consequence of a court’s determination that it does not have jurisdiction to
hear a suit related to the Bradley Property. 159 The Supreme Court found
Patchak’s reliance on United States v. Klein unpersuasive. 160 In Klein, the
estate of a former Confederate soldier brought suit to recover property
seized by the federal government during the Civil War, but a statute
required claimants to prove their loyalty in order to reclaim. 161 The soldier
received a pardon prior to death, which the Supreme Court previously held
proved loyalty under the statute.162 After the estate received a favorable
judgment, Congress passed a second statute declaring pardons proof of
disloyalty.163 The second statute mandated that when a claimant has
accepted a pardon, the jurisdiction of the court hearing his suit ceased, and
his suit must be dismissed.164 Even in settled suits, the statute instructed the
Supreme Court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 165 The Supreme Court in
Klein held the second statute to be an infringement of both the executive

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Patchak II, 138 S. Ct. at 906.
Id.
Id. at 908.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
Patchak II, 138 S. Ct. at 908.
United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 543 (1869).
Patchak II, 138 S. Ct. at 908.
Id. at 908-09.
Id. at 909.
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and judicial powers.166 Unlike the impermissible statute in Klein, section
2(b) does not exercise a power vested in another branch of government nor
does it strip jurisdiction selectively. 167 Instead, section 2(b) removes the
Bradley Property wholly from federal jurisdiction, which is entirely within
the legislative power of Congress.168
As to Patchak’s second argument, while Article III does forbid Congress
from “retroactively commanding the federal courts to reopen final
judgments,”169 section 2(b) does not disturb a final judgment, as Patchak I
did not provide one; it only remanded the suit back to the district court for
further proceedings on the merits.170 ”Congress has the power to ‘apply
newly enacted, outcome-altering legislation in pending civil cases,’” even
when it seems to unfairly target specific cases like it does here. 171 As
Patchak’s suit lacks a final judgment, section 2(b)’s reference to “pending”
cases applies, and Article III is not implicated. 172 Because the Gun Lake Act
did not violate Article III of the Constitution, the Supreme Court affirmed
the dismissal of Patchak’s suit.173
2. Concurrences
In his concurrence, Justice Breyer stated that when read in context with
section 2(a), which reaffirms the property as trust land, application of
section 2(b) brings about the “same real-world result” as the first section:
keeping the Bradley Property in trust.174 Section 2(b) “simplifies judicial
decisionmaking” by making the only determination of the court whether the
lawsuit before it relates to the Bradley Property.175 Accordingly, the whole
statute “need not be read to do more than eliminate the cost of litigating a
lawsuit that will inevitably uphold the land’s trust status.”176
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence, joined by Justice Sotomayor, begins
simply: “What Congress grants, it may retract.”177 While Congress must
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995).
170. Patchak I, 567 U.S. 209, 212 (2012).
171. Patchak II, 138 S. Ct. at 910 (quoting Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310,
1325 (2016)).
172. Id. at 909.
173. Id. at 911.
174. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 912 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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first give consent to suit, which the Supreme Court concluded it did in
Patchak I under the APA general waiver of sovereign immunity, 178
Congress may also reinstate its sovereign immunity at any time. 179 This is
true even when litigation is pending.180 Because the Gun Lake Act operated
as an effective restoration of immunity, Justice Ginsburg argued, the
Supreme Court need not look further to resolve Patchak’s suit.181
While Justice Sotomayor agreed with several aspects of the dissent—
namely, that Congress may not direct an entry of judgment for a particular
party, and that removing jurisdiction over a single suit is not enough to
constitute a change in the law—she, like Justice Ginsburg, would read the
Gun Lake Act as restoring federal sovereign immunity. 182 The majority of
Patchak I (Sotomayor reminds us she was the single dissenter) recognized
that Congress could bar lawsuits pertaining to the government’s ownership
of the land at issue. 183 Because the Gun Lake Act is “most naturally read”
as restoring sovereign immunity, Justice Sotomayor would affirm on that
basis alone and avoid the separation-of-powers analysis regarding
jurisdiction-stripping statutes.184
3. Dissent
Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices
Kennedy and Gorsuch, which scolded the plurality for giving Congress the
unqualified authority to decide the outcome of a single pending case “in
favor of the litigant it preferred, under a law adopted just for the
occasion.”185 He explained that the Framers’ explicitly established the
judiciary separate from the legislature and the executive, dividing power
and authority amongst the three because of a “concern that a legislature
should not be able unilaterally to impose a substantial deprivation on one
person.”186 When the Gun Lake Act was passed in 2014, there were no
other pending suits relating to the Bradley Property, and no other challenges
could be filed as the APA six-year statute of limitations had expired. 187 That

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Patchak I, 567 U.S. 209, 215-25 (2012).
Patchak II, 138 S. Ct. at 912 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 913 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. at 914 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Patchak I, 567 U.S. at 224.
Patchak II, 138 S. Ct. at 914 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 922 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 962 (1983).
Patchak II, 138 S. Ct. at 916-17 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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Congress sought to “target [Patchak] for adverse treatment and direct the
precise disposition of his pending case” is obvious. 188
Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts argued, nothing in the language of
section 2(b) suggests it even is a jurisdiction-stripping statute. The Supreme
Court in other cases set out a clear rule, requiring Congress to have plainly
stated its intention that a statutory limitation further poses a jurisdiction
restriction; without a plain statement, the Supreme Court has treated it as
non-jurisdictional.189 Even if section 2(b) is jurisdictional, when, as here,
Congress uses its power to manipulate jurisdictional rules to direct the
outcome of pending litigation, it has impermissibly assumed the role of
judge and violated Article III. 190 More egregious is that with the dismissal
of his federal case, Patchak is left with no alternative means of review, as
state courts cannot exercise civil jurisdiction over trust land unless the tribe
gives its consent.191
Chief Justice Roberts ends his dissent by disagreeing with Justices
Ginsburg and Sotomayor that section 2(b) should be read as restoring
sovereign immunity, as Congress did not express an “unambiguous
intention to withdraw” a remedy as required, nor did the Gun Lake Act use
any language (“immunity,” “consent to be sued,” “United States,”) that
suggests an intention to restore immunity. 192 He also dismissed Justice
Breyer’s approval of section 2(b) for making judicial determinations
simpler and eliminating litigation costs as “cavalier euphemisms for
exercising the judicial power.”193 Such an exercise works by “relieving the
Judiciary of its job,” making section 2(b) a transgression of the proper
allocation of powers under the Constitution. 194
III. Analysis
A. The Convergence of Patchak I and Carcieri Unduly Delays Economic
Development of Newly Acquired Tribal Lands
Patchak I and Carcieri amount to a double-failure of the Supreme Court
to support and enforce the ultimate purpose of the IRA: to give tribal
188. Id.
189. Id. at 918 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568
U.S. 145, 153 (2013); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-16 (2006).
190. Patchak II, 138 S. Ct. at 919-20 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 921 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (2018).
192. Patchak II, 138 S. Ct. at 921-22 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 922 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
194. Id.
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nations more control over their own economic well-being. While the
Carcieri decision was bad enough, it appeared to apply only to parcels that
received an affirmative final determination but had not yet been formally
taken into trust. This is evidenced by the fact that the Supreme Court in its
decision did not disturb nor even consider a previous 1800-acre parcel that
was taken into trust for the Narragansett Tribe in 1988.195 But Patchak I
takes Carcieri a step further and leaves what would have otherwise been a
settled trust decision open to collateral attack and possible retroactive
divestment. 196
Patchak I also allows for a wider group of plaintiffs to challenge a trust
decision and significantly extends the time in which those plaintiffs can file
a challenge. Prior to Patchak I, a plaintiff with “aesthetic” or
“environmental” concerns surrounding trust land use could bring suit under
other applicable statutes, such as the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act or the
National Environmental Policy Act, which were subject to the APA sixyear statute of limitations. 197 After Patchak I, any plaintiff may challenge
the government’s decision to take land into trust subject to the APA, so
long as he does not make a personal claim of an interest in the land. 198
In an effort to limit the uncertainties brought about by the Patchak I
decision, the BIA released its own “Patchak Patch,” a series of significant
amendments to its 25 C.F.R. Part 151 fee-to-trust regulations. 199 The final
rule, published in November 2013, eliminated the prior thirty-day waiting
period, meaning land is immediately taken into trust after the final
determination to acquire land.200 Secondly, the final rule established that
any “interested parties” in an acquisition must make themselves known to
the BIA in writing prior to the final decision so that they may later receive
written notice of the final decision. 201 It further required the BIA to publish
notice in a newspaper of general circulation in the affected area to inform
195. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 385 (2009).
196. Patchak I, 567 U.S. 209, 228 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 237 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2721 (2018); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370e
(2018)
198. Patchak I, 567 U.S. at 228 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
199. Heidi McNeil Staudenmaier & Harsh P. Parikh, The BIA Proposes Patchak Patch
Regulations for Fee-to-Trust Land Acquisitions, CASINO LAWYER, Autumn 2013, at 24,
https://www.imgl.org/sites/default/files/media/publications/biaproposespatchakpatchregulati
onsfeetotrustlandacquisitions_heidimcneilstaudenmaier_harshparikh_cl_fall_2013.pdf.
200. Land Acquisitions: Appeals of Land Acquisition Decisions, 78 Fed. Reg. 67928,
67930 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 151).
201. Id.
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unknown interested parties and specified that the APA statute-of-limitations
began to run upon first publication of such newspaper notice. 202 Thirdly, the
final rule distinguished between decisions issued by BIA officials and the
Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs. If a BIA official issues the decision,
interested parties have thirty days following in which they must exhaust all
administrative remedies before seeking APA review; if they fail to do so,
judicial review is unavailable to them. 203 If the decision is instead issued by
the Assistant Secretary, the decision is final and not subject to
administrative review. 204 While this regulatory fix is helpful, it is not itself a
solution, as tribes still must wait six years and hope that a challenge does
not arise that divests the United States of title.
Although Patchak II does provide a better remedy to Patchak I and
Carcieri, having each individual tribe attempt to persuade Congress to pass
specific legislation every time it seeks to protect trust property is at best an
incomplete solution, if not a nearly useless one. It unduly burdens tribes
that have already endured the years or decades long fee-to-trust process to
even convince the government to take the land into trust in the first place.
Even if a tribe had favorable legislation introduced each time, the process to
then have that legislation passed is protracted and the chance of success
unknown.
B. The Patchak II Remedy Fails to Solve the Problems of Patchak I and
Carcieri
That the Patchak II remedy provides no real finality is evidenced in
Littlefield v. United States Department of Interior,205 which involved a
dispute regarding a trust acquisition for the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe
(“the Mashpee”). The Mashpee Tribe, located on the southeast coast of
Cape Cod, Massachusetts, was federally recognized by the DOI in 2007. 206
Having no federal reservation, the Mashpee filed its fee-to-trust application
soon after, seeking to place into trust a 170-acre parcel in the town of
Mashpee and a second 150-acre parcel in the nearby town of Taunton. 207
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. 199 F. Supp. 3d 391 (D. Mass. 2016).
206. Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgement of the Mashpee Wampanoag
Indian Tribal Council, Inc. of Massachusetts, 72 Fed. Reg. 8007 (Feb. 22, 2007).
207. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Record of Decision: Trust Acquisition and Reservation
Proclamation for 151 Acres in the City of Taunton, Massachusetts, and 170 Acres in the
Town of Mashpee, Massachusetts, for the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe 4 (Sept. 2015),
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The Taunton site was intended for economic development in the form of a
“400,000 [square-foot] gaming-resort complex.”208 The generated revenue
would be used to aid tribal members directly and fund cultural preservation
efforts and other vital tribal programs. 209
On September 25, 2015, the DOI published notice of its final decision to
take both parcels into trust, making it the “initial reservation” of the
Mashpee. 210 The DOI premised its decision on extensive recorded history
that showed the Mashpee had existed continuously in the area set aside for
it by the colonial government and that both the United States and the State
of Massachusetts recognized its ownership and control of the land. 211 This
history caused the DOI to treat the area as a “‘reservation’ for purposes of
the IRA”, making the Mashpee qualified to take land into trust “under the
second definition of ‘Indian.’”212 Consequently, the DOI did not determine
whether the Mashpee also met the first definition as qualified by the
Carcieri decision.213 Both parcels were taken into trust November 10,
2015.214 The Mashpee quickly began development on Massachusetts’s first
full-scale resort casino, at an estimated cost of $1 billion. 215
Residents of Taunton (“the Littlefields”) filed suit under the APA to
challenge the decision in February 2016.216 They specifically challenged the
DOI’s interpretation and application of the second IRA definition of
“Indian.”217 Whether the Mashpee met the second definition as
“descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within
the present boundaries of any Indian reservation” turned on further
definition of the term “such members.”218 The Littlefields argued that “such
members” plainly referred to the phrase “all persons of Indian descendent
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/public/oig/pdf/idc1-031724.pdf
[hereinafter
2015 Record of Decision].
208. Littlefield, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 393.
209. 2015 Record of Decision, supra note 207, at 121-22.
210. Land Acquisitions; Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe, 80 Fed. Reg. 57848 (Sept. 25,
2015).
211. 2015 Record of Decision, supra note 207, at 79.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Littlefield v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 199 F. Supp. 3d 391, 393 (D. Mass. 2016).
215. Sean Murphy, Mashpee Tribe Speeds Up Timetable for Taunton Casino Opening,
BOSTON GLOBE (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/03/14/mashpeewampanoag-tribe-prepares-unveil-schedule-for-massive-casinotaunton/eHpal5nQfslYIyNgaSuFBJ/story.html.
216. Littlefield, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 393.
217. Id. at 394.
218. Id. at 395-96.
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who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal
jurisdiction” in the first definition.219 This interpretation would, in line with
the Carcieri decision, also limit the second definition to those tribes under
federal jurisdiction in 1934.220 The DOI countered that because “such
members” is ambiguous, the Secretary did reasonably interpret it to refer
only to “all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized
Indian tribe,” making the temporal limitation absent in the second
definition. 221
The court sided with the Littlefields and concluded that the word “such”
in the second definition clearly referred to the “members” described in the
first definition, integrating the 1934 restriction into both. 222 It based its
conclusion on the plain meaning of the word “such” (defined as “of the
character, quality, or extent previously indicated or implied”) and found
there to be no language in the IRA that would suggest it referred only to a
portion of the antecedent phrase.223 It dismissed the DOI argument that such
a reading rendered the second definition “entirely surplus.”224 The court
explained that the two definitions remained distinct. 225 The first definition
requires actual membership in a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction in
1934.226 The second definition encompasses the descendants of members
who were under federal jurisdiction in 1934 and were living on reservations
at that time.227 After holding that the second definition unambiguously
incorporated the first, the court declared the Secretary lacked authority to
acquire land for the Mashpee, and on July 28, 2016, it remanded the issue
back to the agency for further proceedings. 228 While the DOI—then under
the Trump administration—did initially appeal, it later asked for and was
granted voluntary dismissal in May 2017.229
Fearful of the DOI’s refusal to continue to defend the trust status of its
reservation in court, the Mashpee utilized the Patchak II remedy. 230 In
219. Id. at 396.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 397.
223. Id. at 398.
224. Id. at 399.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 400.
229. Littlefield v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, No. 16-2481, 2017 WL 10238203 (1st Cir.
May 8, 2017).
230. Hearing on Indian Affairs Bills Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 115th
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March 2018, the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe Reservation Reaffirmation
Act (“the Mashpee Act”) was introduced in the House and Senate. 231 Like
the Gun Lake Act, the Mashpee Act reaffirms the reservation as trust land
and requires that all actions pending in federal court relating to the
reservation be dismissed. 232 Neither bill gave new or special rights to the
Mashpee. 233 Both bills had bipartisan support, and passage was further
encouraged by the City of Taunton, the National Congress of American
Indians, numerous intertribal organizations, including the National Indian
Gaming Association, and twenty-five individual tribes.234
On September 7, 2018, two years following remand, the DOI issued its
opinion that in light of the Littlefield holding, the Mashpee had not been
under federal jurisdiction in 1934, and the DOI therefore lacked authority to
take land into trust on its behalf. 235 Answering whether the Mashpee had
been under proper federal jurisdiction required the determination of
whether the United States had taken any action establishing or reflecting
federal responsibility for or over the Mashpee in or before 1934, and if it
did, whether that status remained intact in 1934. 236 The DOI explained that
while there existed significant dealings with the State of Massachusetts,
little to no evidence of significant contact between the United States and the
Mashpee via treaty, legislation, or federal administrative action existed. 237
Absent indicia of federal jurisdiction, the Mashpee failed to qualify under
either the IRA’s first or second definitions of “Indian.” 238
In response to the DOI decision, and to supplement the pending
legislation, the Mashpee filed suit against the agency in the Federal District
Court for the District of Columbia.239 The complaint argues that the
Cong. 2 (2018) (statement of Cedric Cromwell, Chairman, Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe),
https://naturalresources.house.gov/imo/media/doc/7.24_testimony_cromwell.pdf [hereinafter
Cromwell Testimony].
231. H.R. 5244, 115th Cong. (2018); S. 2628, 115th Cong. (2018).
232. H.R. 5244 § 2; S. 2628 § 2.
233. Cromwell Testimony, supra note 230, at 3.
234. Id.
235. Memorandum Letter from Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs Tara Sweeney to
Mashpee Wampanoag Chairman Cedric Cromwell 1 (Sept. 7, 2018) https://www.indianz.
com/News/2018/09/10/mashpee090718.pdf [hereinafter Sweeney Memorandum].
236. The Meaning of ‘Under Federal Jurisdiction’ for Purposes of the Indian
Reorganization Act, Op. Sol. Interior No. M-37029, at 19 (Mar. 12, 2014), https://www.
doi.gov/sites/doi.opengov.ibmcloud.com/files/uploads/M-37029.pdf.
237. Sweeney Memorandum, supra note 235, at 20.
238. Id. at 28.
239. Philip Marcelo, Tribe Sues Feds over Decision Not to Affirm Reservation, AP NEWS
(Sept. 27, 2018), https://apnews.com/f252529bf7b54a1c9954992f285a71dc.
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judgment is contrary to law and asks the court to set it aside as arbitrary and
capricious.240 The Mashpee also appealed the Littlefield decision, which
remains pending in the U.S. First Circuit Court of Appeals. 241 Until all legal
challenges are finalized, the DOI will continue to hold the land in trust.242
Because the IRA is the only vehicle by which the Mashpee can acquire
trust land, if the trust status of its reservation is rescinded, the Mashpee will
be effectively landless unless and until Congress chooses to act. Feeling
“utterly abandoned by [its] federal trustee,” the Mashpee Tribe continues to
petition Congress for passage of its Act. 243 Mashpee Chairman Cedric
Cromwell has said that if the reservation is lost, the “ability to operate as a
tribal government would be crushed.”244 Even just the uncertainty
surrounding the trust status has caused the Tribe “a massive loss of
resources and services” meant to aid Mashpee citizens. 245
The Mashpee Act was reintroduced with identical language on January 8,
2019, after it failed to make any progress in the previous Congress. 246
Although it still has bipartisan support and the widespread backing of
Indian Country, challengers to the legislation remain.247 Lawmakers from
Connecticut and Rhode Island have resisted its passage, and competing
gaming operators continue to be vocal in their opposition.248 Despite federal
acknowledgement of its aboriginal existence, and after having spent eight
years inside the bureaucratic fee-to-trust process and another four in court
and before Congress, there does not appear to be an end in sight for the
Mashpee. The Patchak II remedy appears to be no remedy at all.

240. Id.
241. Tanner Stening, Interior: Mashpee Tribe’s Land Remains in Trust Pending Appeal,
CAPE COD TIMES (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.capecodtimes.com/news/20180911/interiormashpee-tribes-land-remains-in-trust-pending-appeal.
242. Id.
243. Tanner Stening, Mashpee Tribe Sues Interior Department over Land Decision,
INQUIRER & MIRROR (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.ack.net/news/20180927/mashpee-tribesues-interior-department-over-land-decision.
244. Tanner Stening, Bill to Protect Mashpee Tribe’s Land Refiled, CAPE COD TIMES
(Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.capecodtimes.com/news/20190107/bill-to-protect-mashpeetribes-land-refiled [hereinafter Stening, Bill Refiled].
245. #StandwithMashpee, MASHPEE WAMPANOAG TRIBE, https://mashpeewampanoag
tribe-nsn.gov/standwithmashpee (last visited Jan. 5, 2019).
246. See H.R. 312, 116th Cong. (2019).
247. Stening, Bill Refiled, supra note 244.
248. Id.
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C. Congress Must Step in to Prevent Another Devastating Shift in Federal
Indian Policy
The Littlefield judgement, along with the DOI choosing not to challenge
it, is a dangerous precedent for Indian Country that has led tribal leaders to
call it the dawning of a new termination era.249 This ominous conclusion is
supported by a new draft proposal to further change the 25 C.F.R. Part 151
fee-to-trust regulations.250 These new amendments would require the BIA
to “comply with a final court order and any resulting judicial remedy,
including . . . taking land out of trust."251 Based on the holdings of
Littlefield, Carcieri, and Patchak I, federal courts are no more likely than
the current administration to protect Indian property interests.
Perhaps it is the rise and success of Indian gaming that is changing the
judicial attitude toward tribes, making the trust doctrine and canons of
construction seem superfluous as tribes are no longer perceived as being
“weak or financially defenseless.” 252 This attitude is bolstered by the public
perception that when a tribe takes land into trust it will—no matter the
stated purpose—always build a casino, and that resulting revenue is or can
be used to buy political power and influence. 253 Gaming, in fact, “has
produced the single largest infusion of income into Indian country in
history.”254 When the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act was passed in 1988,
total revenue from Indian gaming equaled $100 million. 255 In 2016, Indian
gaming generated $31.2 billion, 256 nearly half of the United States casino
industry’s $70.16 billion gross gaming revenue. 257
249. Acee Agoyo, ‘Termination Is Here’: Tribes Rally Against Trump Administration,
INDIANZ.COM (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.indianz.com/News/2018/11/14/termination-ishere-tribes-rally-against.asp.
250. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Consultation Draft – Part 151 Land
Acquisition §§ 151.11-.12 (Oct. 2017), https://www.indianaffairs.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/
assets/as-ia/raca/pdf/Consultation%20Draft%20-%20Trust%20Acquisition%20Revisions
.pdf.
251. Id.
252. Skibine, supra note 20, at 38.
253. William Wood, Indians, Tribes, and (Federal) Jurisdiction, 65 U. KAN L. REV. 415,
419-20 (2016).
254. WILKINSON, supra note 43, at 330.
255. Id. at 336.
256. 2016 Indian Gaming Revenues Increased 4.4%, NAT’L INDIAN GAMING COMM’N
(Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.nigc.gov/images/uploads/newsrelease/GGRPR20170717x.pdf.
257. State of the States 2017: The AGA Survey of the Casino Industry, AM. GAMING
ASS’N (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.americangaming.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/2017State-of-the-States.pdf.
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What must be remembered, however, is that this staggering amount is
not spread equally across Indian Country or among the 573 federally
recognized tribes.258 The $31.2 billion was generated by 244 tribes across
twenty-eight states, with fifty-seven percent of that revenue being generated
by smaller gaming operations that grossed less than $25 million. 259 Even
this amount, though substantial, is likely not enough to create and maintain
the social and economic programs necessary to lift and keep a tribe out of
poverty. For the other 329 tribes (that either oppose gaming or are located
in areas where gaming is not financially feasible), and for the tribes with
gaming operations that barely pay for themselves, being in poverty or
otherwise decidedly below middle-class remains the norm.260 Because it is
simply beyond the ability of the average tribe to “exercise[ ] its political
influence to persuade Congress to enact a narrow jurisdiction-stripping
provision that effectively ends all lawsuits threatening its casino” or any
other controversial economic development, the Patchak II remedy is
unavailable to most of Indian Country. 261
The best remedy possible, then, is for Congress to exercise its plenary
power to override the decision in Patchak I. As the Supreme Court
previously held in Mottaz, the sole function of the Indian land exception in
the QTA is to “retain the United States’ immunity from suit by third parties
challenging the United States’ title to land held in trust for Indians.” 262
Therefore, Congress should legislatively affirm that any plaintiff who seeks
to force government relinquishment of title should be barred, regardless of
the strength or type of the plaintiff’s interest. The Supreme Court itself
acknowledged that although Patchak did not seek to protect his own
interest, the practical effect of his suit or any like it is to divest the
government of its interest.263 But it also made clear that it is “for Congress
to tell us, not for us to tell Congress” that the harms should be treated alike
and barred under the QTA.264
By passing legislation that safeguards acquired trust land from
divestiture, Congress would acknowledge and affirm its duty as trustee to
protect those Indian lands—something this Supreme Court and the
258. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 83 Fed. Reg. 34863 (July 23, 2018).
259. 2016 Indian Gaming Revenues Increased 4.4%, supra note 256.
260. WILKINSON, supra note 43, at 330-38.
261. Patchak II, 138 S. Ct. 897, 910 (2018).
262. United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 842 (1986).
263. Patchak I, 567 U.S. 209, 223 (2012).
264. Id. at 224.
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Executive have failed to do. Because the problems of Patchak I and
Carcieri are inseparable, Congress should override both statutory
interpretation decisions. That the purpose of the APA should yield to that of
the IRA and the QTA is due to the special fiduciary relationship between
tribes and the federal government.265 The chipping away of the fee-to-trust
process is a new solution to the old Indian problem, an active pursuit of
termination that Congress must stop to protect the ability of every tribe to
not only meaningfully self-govern, but to exist.
IV. Conclusion
The ultimate purpose of the Indian Reorganization Act is to acquire land
into trust for tribes on which to live and engage in economic development.
This is undermined by the Patchak I and Carcieri decisions. Without the
fee-to-trust process, tribes have few other opportunities to generate revenue
to aid in the care of its citizens. The remedy provided by Patchak II is not
sufficient to provide certainty concerning the status of trust lands.
Therefore, Congress should exercise its plenary power over Indians to pass
a congressional fix to both Patchak I and Carcieri. Doing so would affirm
its trust responsibility and foster greater tribal self-determination.

265. O’Brien, supra note 78, at 608.
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